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Abstract
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal
choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as
those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin
[24] are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. Moreover, opting for this model-free approach
allows us to establish new general results on the impact of risk aversion on savings behaviors.
In particular, we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link
that exists between the notions of prudence and risk aversion.
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1. Introduction
A common approach to study the role of risk aversion is to consider a particular class
of preferences, presumably well-ordered in terms of risk aversion, and then analyze the
decisions that result from preferences within this class. In the context of intertemporal
choice, a number of diﬀerent classes of utility functions have been considered. The most
popular choice consists of preferences à la Epstein and Zin [9], while the frameworks in
Kihlstrom and Mirman [15] and Quiggin’s [24] provide alternative settings.
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chosen. For example, regarding the relation between risk aversion and precautionary savings
in a simple two-period model, the preferences in Kihlstrom and Mirman [15] and Quiggin
[24] lead to the conclusion that precautionary savings rise with risk aversion (Drèze and
Modigliani [8], Yaari [28], and Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt [3]). On the contrary, this relation
is ambiguous when Epstein and Zin’s [9] preferences are used (Kimball and Weil [17]).1
The current paper makes three contributions. First, it discusses the extent to which
the utility classes mentioned above are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. In particular,
we show that, when we consider aversion to marginal increases in risk, Epstein and Zin
preferences are not well-ordered. Second, we suggest a model-free approach that makes
it possible to discuss the role of risk aversion without focusing on any speciﬁc model of
rationality. Third, we apply this setup to establish new general results on the role of risk
aversion. In particular, we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying
the link that exists between risk aversion and prudence.
Our paper relies on an abstract procedure to deﬁne comparative risk aversion, which
assumes no particular structure for the set of consequences. This deﬁnition is inspired by
the seminal work of Yaari [27]. It states that if a given increase in risk is perceived as
worthwhile for a decision maker (because it yields a higher level of ex ante welfare), it
should also be so for any less risk-averse decision maker.
A considerable number of papers have used Yaari’s approach to deﬁne comparative risk-
(or uncertainty-) aversion. This is explicitly the case in Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci [11] and Grant and Quiggin [12], but also implicit in the papers that
have focused on certainty equivalents, such as Chew and Epstein [7] and Epstein and Zin [9],
as well as in Pratt’s [23]. In most cases, although Grant and Quiggin [12] is a noteworthy
exception, Yaari’s procedure was (implicitly or explicitly) implemented based on a minimal-
ist risk ordering, where random objects are only compared to deterministic constructs. Our
paper departs from this minimalist approach to provide novel insights. Instead of focusing
on certainty equivalents to assess the individual’s degree of risk aversion, we also account for
individual preferences over marginal variations in risk.
The notion of comparative aversion that we derive when considering marginal risk vari-
ations is stronger than that focusing on certainty equivalents. In consequence, although
preferences may be well ordered in terms of risk aversion when considering certainty equiva-
lents, this may no longer hold when considering our more stringent comparison. This turns
out to be the case for Epstein and Zin preferences. No similar case can be made against
1More details on the meaning of the preferences à la Kihlstrom and Mirman, Quiggin, and Epstein and
Zin are provided in Section 2.
2Kihlstrom and Mirman or Quiggin’s anticipated utility functions. These latter utility classes
actually seem to be well-suited to provide insights into the impact of risk aversion.
Abandoning these standard but somewhat restrictive frameworks, we establish a general
result allowing us to make predictions about the impact of risk aversion without assuming
any particular form of rationality. It is possible to determine the impact of risk aversion
under relatively weak assumptions on ordinal preferences, as long as states of the world can
be ranked from bad to good independently of the agent’s action. The intuition behind this
result is that risk aversion enhances the willingness to redistribute from good to bad states.
We provide direct applications to savings under uncertainty. In particular we prove, under
weak conditions on ordinal preferences, that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings.
Moreover, we show that risk aversion has a negative (resp. positive) impact on savings
when the rate of return is uncertain, as soon as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is larger (resp. smaller) than one. Risk aversion is also found to have a negative impact on
savings when the lifetime is uncertain, therefore underlining that the relation between time
preference, risk aversion and mortality risk discussed in Bommier [4] is general and is not
restricted to the expected-utility framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present several classes
of utility functions that have been used to analyze the role of risk aversion in intertemporal
models. The main theoretical contents appear in Section 3, which is split up into several
subsections. Subsection 3.1 introduces the relevant concepts, and Subsection 3.2 then focuses
on the simplest random objects that we can think of: “heads or tails” gambles, which are
lotteries with two equally-probable outcomes. This is suﬃcient to provide the main intuition
and to show that Epstein and Zin preferences are not well-ordered in terms of risk aversion.
To increase applicability, the analysis is extended in Section 3.3 to general lotteries. We
deﬁne a formal notion of comparative risk aversion and show how it can be used to obtain
model-free results on the impact of risk aversion. A number of applications providing insights
into the impact of risk aversion on savings behavior are then developed in Section 4.
To help the reader to grasp the paper’s main message, we restrict the use of the term
Proposition to the most signiﬁcant results. The paper also includes other statements, which
are useful for general understanding, or for the relation of our work to that of others, but
which are admittedly less important or original. These are labeled as Result.
2. Popular classes of utility functions disentangling risk aversion from intertem-
poral substitution
We present in this section the main risk preferences that have been suggested in the
literature to discuss the role of risk aversion in intertemporal frameworks. As in Selden [26]
3and many other papers on precautionary savings, we restrict our attention to preferences
over “certain×uncertain” consumption pairs that we denote (c1,e c2) – the tilde emphasizing
that the second element is random.
Kihlstrom and Mirman [15] convincingly explain that the comparison of agents’ risk
aversions is possible if and only if agents have identical preferences over certain prospects. We
therefore focus on utility classes involving diﬀerent risk attitudes, while leaving preferences
over certain consumption paths unchanged. This rules out the standard class of expected-
utility models assuming additively-separable utility functions. Under additive separability,
it is impossible to change risk preferences, without aﬀecting ordinal preferences.2
We consider three extensions of the standard additively-separable expected-utility model,
where we can analyze risk aversion without aﬀecting ordinal preferences. This is not of course
an exhaustive review of what can be found in the literature, but rather focuses on the most
popular speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst setup, which assumes expected utility, was suggested by
Kihlstrom and Mirman [15]. The second one was introduced by Selden [26], building on
the framework in Kreps and Porteus [18], and was then extended by Epstein and Zin [9]
to deal with inﬁnitely-long consumption streams, and appears to be a very convenient way
of studying many intertemporal problems. This has now become by far the most popular
approach to the analysis of risk aversion in intertemporal frameworks. The third class, based
on Quiggin’s [24] anticipated-utility theory, is developed in Yaari [28] for example.
The initial contributions of Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26] and Quiggin [24]
were very general, and not limited to the analysis of intertemporal choices. However, applied
works on savings often assume that preferences over certain consumption paths are additively
separable. The (ordinal) utility U(c1,c2) associated with the certain consumption proﬁle
(c1,c2) is expressed as the sum of the utilities associated with the ﬁrst-period and second-
period consumptions: U(c1,c2) = u1(c1)+u2(c2). We include this assumption of the additive
separability of ordinal preferences in our deﬁnitions of what we call “Kihlstrom and Mirman”,
“Selden” or “Quiggin” utility functions that rank certain consumptions pair as U does.3
Deﬁnition 1 (Utility classes). A utility function U(c1,e c2) is called:
• A Kihlstrom and Mirman utility function UKM
k if there exist continuous increasing real
2One very popular representation is the additive expected utility speciﬁcation: U(c1,e c2) =
c
1−ρ
1
1−ρ +E
h
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1−ρ
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1−ρ
i
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where ρ is interpreted as reﬂecting the agent’s risk aversion. However, changing ρ involves changing ordinal
preferences (in particular, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
ρ) and cannot be used to analyze the
impact of risk aversion. Kihlstrom and Mirman [15] and Epstein and Zin [9] among others discuss this.
3It should be clear that our terminology is only indicative of the general frameworks in which these
particular speciﬁcations may be related. We do not aim to provide a complete account of the contributions
of the corresponding papers, which consider both much broader utility classes and more complex settings.
4functions u1,u2 and k such that UKM
k (c1,e c2) = k−1 (E[k (u1(c1) + u2(e c2))]).
• A Selden utility function US
v if there exist continuous increasing real functions u1,u2
and v such that US
v (c1,e c2) = u1(c1) + u2 (v−1 (E[v(e c2)])).
• A Quiggin utility function U
Q
φ if there exist continuous real functions u1,u2 and a con-
tinuous increasing function φ : [0,1] → [0,1] , with φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1, such that
U
Q
φ (c1,e c2) = u1(c1) + Eφ[u2(e c2)], where Eφ[·] denotes the Choquet expectation opera-
tor associated with φ. For a real random variable e z characterized by the cumulative
distribution function F, this operator is deﬁned as Eφ[e z] = −
R +∞
−∞ z d(φ(1 − F(z))).
One popular speciﬁcation results from choosing isoelastic functions in the Selden utility
function. Setting u1(c) = u2(c) = c1−ρ
1−ρ and v(x) = x1−γ
1−γ yields a class of utility functions
assuming a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution and homothetic preferences.
Such utility functions are often called “Epstein and Zin utility functions”, although they
indicate only imperfectly what can be found in Epstein and Zin [9], who consider preferences
over inﬁnitely-long consumption paths, which is a much more complex issue. Even so, this
terminology has become very popular in the Economic literature, and we think it is more
productive and less confusing to adhere to it, rather than introducing a new one.
Deﬁnition 2. UEZ
γ (c1,e c2) is called an Epstein and Zin utility function if there exist positive
scalars ρ 6= 1 and γ 6= 1 such that:4 UEZ
γ (c1,e c2) =
c
1−ρ
1
1−ρ + 1
1−ρ
 
E

e c
1−γ
2
 1−ρ
1−γ.
Certainty-equivalent arguments have been used to suggest that these Kihlstrom and Mir-
man, Selden, Epstein and Zin, and Quiggin utility functions are well-suited for the analysis
of risk aversion. It can indeed easily be shown that the greater is the concavity of k (for
Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions), the greater is the concavity of v (for Selden utility
functions), the greater is the scalar γ (for Epstein and Zin utility functions) and the greater
is the convexity of φ (for Quiggin utility functions), the smaller (in terms of ordinal utility)
is the certainty equivalent assigned to any random element (c1,e c2). It is then generally con-
sidered that these utility classes are well-ordered in terms of “risk aversion”. Though, we
come back on this statement in Section 3, once we have introduced our formal approach to
comparative risk aversion.
We provide two examples to illustrate that relying on diﬀerent utility classes may yield
diﬀerent conclusions regarding the impact of risk aversion. A ﬁrst example comes from
4The extension to the cases where ρ = 1 or γ = 1 could easily be considered, but is ruled out here to
avoid the systematic discussion of these particular cases.
5the literature on precautionary savings. In a two-period consumption model, precautionary
saving is the optimal amount of saving when second-period income is uncertain minus savings
when income risk can be fully insured. For Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions, it is
straightforward to conclude from Drèze and Modigliani [8] (at least for small risks) that
precautionary savings increase with the concavity of k as long as ﬁrst-period consumption
is a normal good. Risk aversion would then increase precautionary saving. A similar result
is obtained by Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt [3] for Quiggin utility functions. On the contrary,
Kimball and Weil [17] prove in their Proposition 7 that the amount of precautionary savings
is not monotonic in γ, for Epstein and Zin preferences, suggesting that there is no simple
relationship between risk aversion and precautionary savings.
A second example concerns savings when the rate of return is random. Kihlstrom and
Mirman [15] prove that risk aversion increases or decreases optimal savings when the return
on saving is uncertain, according to whether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
smaller or greater than one. This ﬁnding is contradicted by Langlais [19], who shows that
no such result holds in the Selden framework.
Both examples illustrates that the above classes of utility functions may lead to divergent
conclusions regarding the impact of risk aversion on saving behavior. However, we shall see
that for both problems, the role of risk aversion becomes unambiguous and particularly
intuitive once a formal and general sense is given to comparative risk aversion.
3. Theory
3.1. Common features
Many papers, including Pratt [23], Yaari [27], Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Chew and
Epstein [7], Epstein and Zin [9] deﬁne the notion of “more risk-averse than” by considering
certainty equivalents and state that the fact that an agent systematically has lower certainty
equivalents than another one means greater risk aversion. This approach is equivalent to
Yaari [27]’s one, who compares agents in terms of risk aversion by stating that any risk
increase preferred by a given individual should also be preferred by a less risk averse individ-
ual. He uses a minimalist but indisputable deﬁnition of “riskier than” where a lottery `1 is
said to be riskier than a lottery `2 if and only if `2 is a degenerate lottery providing a given
outcome with certainty. Our paper departs from Yaari [27]’s minimalist approach by stating
“being more risk-averse” should mean “greater aversion to increases in risk”, and not only a
greater willingness to avoid all uncertainty. We argue that there are many cases where two
non-degenerate lotteries can be unambiguously compared in terms of riskiness. We account
in this paper for some of these cases, which allows us to deﬁne a notion of comparative risk
6aversion which is stronger than that in Yaari [27], and which leads to interesting predictions
regarding the impact of risk aversion in many concrete problems.
We therefore need a deﬁnition of “being riskier than” which is not a trivial issue. As
explained in Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson [6], the literature on monetary lotteries has
not reached a consensus on what an increase in risk is.5 They review diﬀerent notions, which
are shown to yield diﬀerent predictions regarding the role of risk aversion. We overcome
the diﬃculty by considering consensual risk comparisons. First, we restrict our attention to
basic “heads or tails” gambles, which only have a good and a bad payoﬀ. Risk comparison
is then particularly indisputable. Second, we extend our analysis to more general lotteries
allowing us to derive results with a broader scope. For sake of clarity, we name these random
objects respectively gambles and lotteries.
3.1.1. The setting
This section sets out the common setting for both gambles and lotteries.
State and lottery sets. We consider an abstract space set X endowed with an ordinal pref-
erence relation . Uncertainty is represented by a probability space (Ω,F,Pr), where Ω is
the sample space including all states of the world (it is countable in the case of heads or
tails, but not for more general lotteries), F is the σ−algebra of events, which are subsets
of Ω, and Pr is the associated probability measure. Lotteries are random variables, more
precisely measurable functions from the sample space Ω to the state space X. We denote by
L(X) the set of lotteries with outcomes in X. The function ` : Ω → X of L(X) is a random
variable, while `(ω) ∈ X with ω ∈ Ω represents the realization of the lottery when state ω
occurs. We denote by δx ∈ L(X) a degenerate lottery, which pays oﬀ x ∈ X with certainty.
At this stage, it noteworthy that we do not deﬁne the set of lotteries as the set of measures
deﬁned on the state space X, as it is often popular in the risk literature since Anscombe
and Auman [1] and Fishburn [10]. However, our paper deals with the impact of comparative
risk aversion in two period saving problems. Deﬁning lotteries as random variables allows
us to simplify the discussion of intuitions driving our results and notably to speak of lottery
outcomes in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states.
Risk preferences. We consider two agents A and B with respective preferences A and B
over a subset Y of L(X). This set Y may be equal to L(X) but for greater generality we
5Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson only consider mean-preserving increases in risk, but the notions they
discuss could easily be generalized to compare distributions with diﬀerent means.
7only assume that Y includes the set of degenerate gambles.
{δx|x ∈ X} ⊆ Y ⊆ L(X)
We assume that the risk preferences A and B are consistent with ordinal preferences:
Assumption 1 (Consistency with ordinal preferences). Preferences over gambles are
consistent with ordinal preferences if:
x  y ⇔ δx 
i δy for all x,y ∈ X and i = A,B
Agents A and B rank degenerate lotteries as ordinal preferences rank outcomes. Without
reproducing the discussion in Kihlstrom and Mirman [15] and Epstein and Zin [9], we take
for granted that agents are comparable in terms of risk aversion if and only if they have the
same ordinal preferences.
Another natural property when considering risk preferences is ordinal dominance, as
formalized for example in Chew and Epstein [7]. The intuition behind this property is
simple: any agent should prefer a lottery providing always a better outcome than another
lottery (whatever the state of the world). Formally:
Deﬁnition 3 (Ordinal dominance). Preferences over gambles i (i = A,B) fulﬁll ordi-
nal dominance when we have for any lotteries `, `0 ∈ Y :
(i) if for all ω ∈ Ω, `(ω)  `0(ω) then ` i `0,
(ii) moreover, if there exists ω ∈ Ω such that `(ω)  `0(ω), then ` i `0.
According to this deﬁnition, a ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated lottery should not be
preferred. Moreover, a ﬁrst-order stochastically dominating lottery is strictly preferred if
and only if it pays oﬀ a strictly better outcome in at least one state of the world.
It can be argued that this is a reasonable requirement for deﬁning rational risk preferences.
However, as some popular preferences (such as Selden and Epstein and Zin ones) do not
satisfy this property (see for example the discussion in Chew and Epstein [7]), we do not
systematically make this assumption, but mention it whenever necessary.
3.1.2. A formal deﬁnition of comparative risk aversion
We now clarify the procedure we use to give a sense to risk-aversion comparisons, when
we consider a general set of outcomes. Intuitively, as in Yaari [27], an agent A will be said to
be more risk-averse than an agent B, if any increase in risk that is considered to be desirable
8by A is also considered so by B. This procedure is general in the sense that it is valid in
both the gamble and the lottery setups. However, the deﬁnition of an “increase in risk” is
diﬀerent from Yaari’s one and across these setups.
Formally, we suppose that there exists a binary relation R deﬁned over the lottery set
Y . This relation is interpreted as “riskier than” and more precisely as “at least as risky as”.
For example, for `, `0 ∈ Y , `R`0 means that the lottery ` is (weakly) riskier than `0. The
relationship R is supposed to be reﬂexive and transitive, and thus deﬁnes a partial preorder.
We now set out our deﬁnition of comparative risk aversion.
Deﬁnition 4 (Comparative risk aversion). Let R be a partial preorder “riskier than”
deﬁned over the lottery set Y . A is more (weakly) risk-averse than B with respect to R if
for all `, `0 ∈ Y :
`R`
0 and ` 
A `
0 =⇒ ` 
B `
0
This deﬁnition states that any riskier lottery, which is preferred by the more risk-averse
agent is also preferred by the less risk-averse agent. This deﬁnition is reﬂexive by construc-
tion, and has of course to be completed with a reasonable notion of “riskier than”.
3.2. Theory, Part 1: Heads or tails gambles
We precise the previous setting, when we restrict our attention to heads or tails gambles.
3.2.1. The setting
We suppose that the sample space is reduced to heads or tails: Ω = {h,l} and that both
states h and l occur with the same probability. We denote by H(X) the set of heads or tails
gambles with outcomes in X. An element of H(X) denoted (xl;xh) is the lottery yielding
xl ∈ X with probability 0.5 and xh ∈ X with probability 0.5. For sake of simplicity and
without loss of generality, we always suppose that the ﬁrst outcome is not better than the
second: xh  xl. Remember that we call these simple binary lotteries gambles, while the
more general ones are called lotteries.
We consider two agents A and B with preferences A and B over gambles in Y ⊆ H(X)
that are consistent with ordinal preferences (Assumption 1).
3.2.2. Comparative riskiness
Deﬁnition 4 of comparative risk aversion supposes a relation R comparing the riskiness
of gambles. We take advantage of the very basic structure of gambles to derive reasonable
properties of the partial preorder R and see that it is not necessary to make fully explicit
this relation to derive non-trivial results. We consider two gambles (xl;xh) and (yl;yh) of
9the set Y . Since outcomes are ordered (xh  xl and yh  yl), we are left with four possible
combinations:
Case 1: (xh  yh and xl  yl) or (xh  yh and xl  yl)
Case 2: (yh  xh and yl  xl) or (yh  xh and yl  xl)
Case 3: xh  yh  yl  xl
Case 4: yh  xh  xl  yl
In Cases 1 and 2, one gamble strictly ﬁrst-order dominates the other one. There may
be diverse views about the relative riskiness of (xl;xh) and (yl;yh), depending on the values
of xl,xh,yl and yh, but this does not really matter as we expect preferences between these
gambles to be guided by monotonicity properties and unrelated to risk and risk aversion.
In Cases 3 and 4, the lucky outcome of one gamble is better than the lucky outcome
of the other, while the reverse is true for the unlucky outcome. We characterize such cases
using the notion of spread that we deﬁne below:
Deﬁnition 5 (Gamble spread). The gamble (xl;xh) is a spread of (yl;yh) (outcomes are
ordered) , which is denoted by (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh), if the following relationship holds:
(xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) ⇐⇒ xh  yh  yl  xl
If (xl;xh) is a spread of (yl;yh), choosing (xl;xh) instead of (yl;yh) involves taking the
chance of being in a better position if the odds are good, but ending up in a worse situation
if the odds are bad. It is then indisputable that (xl;xh) is riskier than (yl;yh). If the ordinal
preference relation  is represented by a utility function, (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) implies that
the distribution of ex-post utilities associated with the gamble (xl;xh) is more dispersed
than that with the gamble (yl;yh) in the strong sense of Bickel and Lehman [2], whatever
the utility function representing . The fact that (xl;xh) is considered to be riskier than
(yl;yh) whenever (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) is therefore particularly robust: it is not restricted to any
particular choice of ex-post utility dispersion, and is independent of the cardinality.
While there may be disagreement about the relative riskiness of (xl;xh) and (yl;yh) in
Cases 1 and 2, a minimal requirement for any “riskier than” relation R is that it respects the
ranking of the spread relationship `. We additionally impose that if the gamble (xl;xh) is a
spread of (yl;yh) in a strict sense (that is with either xh  yh or yl  xl) then (yl;yh) cannot
be considered to be riskier than (xl;xh). We call these requirements spread compatibility:
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ible if and only if:
1. (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) ⇒ (xl;xh)R(yl;yh)
2. If (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) and (xh  yh or yl  xl), it cannot be the case that (yl;yh)R(xl;xh).
The next result proves that the ordinal dominance together with the agreement over the
statement that a spread involves an increase in risk are suﬃcient to deﬁne an unambiguous
measure of comparative risk aversion for gambles. It is then not necessary to fully explicit
the relation R in order to obtain a universal sense for being “more risk-averse than”.
Result 1. We consider two agents A and B with preferences satisfying the ordinal dom-
inance. If agent A is more risk-averse than agent B with respect to a spread-compatible
partial order R, then it will also hold for any other spread compatible partial order R0.
Proof. We consider two gambles (xl;xh) and (yl;yh), with (xl;xh)R0(yl;yh) and (xl;xh) A
(yl;yh). We prove that (xl;xh) B (yl;yh). There are at most four possibilities:
1. (xl;xh) strictly ﬁrst-order dominates (yl;yh). Due to ordinal-dominance, (xl;xh) B
(yl;yh).
2. (yl;yh) strictly ﬁrst-order dominates (xl;xh). We rule out this possibility, because
ordinal-dominance implies (yl;yh) A (xl;xh), which contradicts (xl;xh) A (yl;yh).
3. (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh), which implies (xl;xh)R(yl;yh), since R is spread compatible. A being
more risk-averse than B relative to R, the Deﬁnition 4 of comparative risk aversion
implies (xl;xh) B (yl;yh);
4. (yl;yh) ` (xl;xh). The spread compatibility implies (yl;yh)R0(xl;xh). Since we also
have (xl;xh)R0(yl;yh), it implies xl ∼ yl and xh ∼ yh (part (ii) of the deﬁnition of
spread compatibility), and thus (xl;xh) B (yl;yh) due to ordinal-dominance.
3.2.3. Application to standard classes of preferences over certain ×uncertain consumption
pairs
We now examine whether the utility classes mentioned in Section 2 are well-ordered
with respect to this comparative risk aversion relation. We specify our setting to ensure
compatibility with these utility classes. The set of outcomes X is the set of admissible
11two-period consumption proﬁles. We restrict our attention to gambles, where ﬁrst-period
consumption is certain. The sole source of uncertainty concerns second-period consumption,
which may be either low (state l) or high (state h) with equal probability. We call Y the
set of such gambles, with certain ﬁrst-period consumption. An element of Y is denoted
(c1,(cl
2,ch
2)), where c1 is the certain ﬁrst-period consumption, while (cl
2,ch
2) is the gamble
over second-period consumption.
The preferences associated with Kihlstrom and Mirman, and Quiggin utility functions
satisfy ordinal dominance. From Result 1, every spread-compatible relation R yields identical
conclusions about comparative risk aversion within these utility classes. The following result
characterizes the comparative risk aversion ordering in both frameworks.
Result 2 (Standard risk preferences and risk aversion). For Kihlstrom and Mirman,
and Quiggin utility functions, the following characterization holds:
1. An agent with utility function UKM
kA is more risk-averse than an agent with utility
function UKM
kB with respect to any spread-compatible relation R if and only if kA is
more concave than kB.
2. An agent with utility function U
Q
φA is more risk-averse than agent with utility function
U
Q
φB with respect to any spread-compatible relation R if and only if φ
A(1
2) ≤ φ
B(1
2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result states that both Kihlstrom and Mirman and Quiggin preferences are
well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. However, such a simple characterization does not hold
for Epstein and Zin utility classes. On the contrary, we prove the following negative result:
Proposition 1 (Epstein and Zin utility functions and risk aversion). Let A and B
be two agents with respective utility functions UEZ
γA and UEZ
γB , where γA 6= γB. There exists
no spread-compatible relation R, such that A is more risk-averse than B with respect to R.
Proof. Assume that γA > γB and consider a spread-compatible relation R. We show that
neither A is more risk-averse than B, nor is B more risk-averse than A.
Proof that A is not more risk-averse than B.
We construct two gambles Ga ` Gb (and thus Ga RGb for every spread-compatible rela-
tion R), such that agent A is indiﬀerent between both gambles, and agent B strictly prefers
Gb to Ga. This generates a contradiction with A being more risk-averse than B.
12With 0 < ε << 1,ca,cb > 0, Ga and Gb are deﬁned as follows:
G
a =

ca,

3
1
1−ρ(1 − ε),3
1
1−ρ(1 + ε)

G
b = (cb, (1 − 2ε,1 + 2ε))
where:6
c
1−ρ
a − c
1−ρ
b =

(1 − 2ε)1− γA + (1 + 2ε)1−γA
2
 1−ρ
1−γA
− 3

(1 − ε)1−γA + (1 + ε)1−γA
2
 1−ρ
1−γA
1. Agent A is indiﬀerent between Ga and Gb. UEZ
γB (Ga) = UEZ
γB (Gb) directly stems from
the construction of ca and cb.
2. The gamble Ga is a spread of Gb, Ga ` Gb, if:
c1−ρ
a
1 − ρ
+
3
1 − ρ
(1 − ε)
1−ρ <
c
1−ρ
b
1 − ρ
+
1
1 − ρ
(1 − 2ε)
1−ρ (1)
<
c
1−ρ
b
1 − ρ
+
1
1 − ρ
(1 + 2ε)
1−ρ <
c1−ρ
a
1 − ρ
+
3
1 − ρ
(1 + ε)
1−ρ
Using Taylor expansions to express c1−ρ
a − c
1−ρ
b , we show in the following that the
inequality (1) holds when 0 < ε << 1. First:
(j = 1,2)

(1 − jε)1−γA + (1 + jε)1−γA
2
 1−ρ
1−γA
= 1 −
γA(1 − ρ)
2
j2ε2 + O(ε3), (2)
where O(ε3) denotes a function such that
O(ε3)
ε3 is bounded as ε tends to zero.
Using the above ﬁrst-order approximations (j = 1,2), the diﬀerence c1−ρ
a − c
1−ρ
b sim-
pliﬁes into:
c1−ρ
a
1 − ρ
−
c
1−ρ
b
1 − ρ
= −
2
1 − ρ
−
γA
2
ε
2 + O(ε
3) (3)
In addition, both of the following approximations hold:
3
1 − ρ
(1 ± ε)
1−ρ −
1
1 − ρ
(1 ± 2ε)
1−ρ =
2
1 − ρ
± ε + O(ε
2) (4)
Combining Eq.(2)–(4), we obtain that condition (1) holds for 0 < ε << 1. Ga is then
a spread of Gb, which implies that GaRGb since R is spread compatible.
6It is always possible to ﬁnd a pair of ﬁrst-period consumptions (ca,cb) that satisfy this equality, whatever
the value of ρ, since the range of x1−ρ − y1−ρ is R, when x and y cover R+.
133. Agent B strictly prefers Gb to Ga. We have:
UEZ
γB (Gb) − UEZ
γB (Ga) =
c
1−ρ
b
1 − ρ
−
c
1−ρ
a
1 − ρ
+
1
1 − ρ

(1 − 2ε)1−γB + (1 + 2ε)1−γB
2
 1−ρ
1−γB
−
3
1 − ρ

(1 − ε)1−γB + (1 + ε)1−γB
2
 1−ρ
1−γB
Using approximations (2) and (3) where γA is replaced by γB, we obtain:
U
EZ
γB (G
b) − U
EZ
γB (G
a) =
1
2
(γA − γB)ε
2 + O(ε
3) > 0 since γA > γB
As a conclusion, A cannot be more risk-averse than B with respect to R.
Proof that B is not more risk-averse than A.
We consider two gambles Ha and Hb, with c > 0 and 0 < ε << 1:
H
a =

c,

(1 − ε)
1
1−γB ,(1 + ε)
1
1−γB

and H
b = (c, (1,1))
Hb is a degenerate gamble paying oﬀ the consumption proﬁle (c,1) with certainty.
1. Agent B is indiﬀerent between both gambles, since UEZ
γB (Ha) = UEZ
γB (Hb) = c1−ρ
1−ρ + 1
1−ρ.
2. The gamble Ha is obviously a spread of Hb. Thus HaRHb since R is spread compatible.
3. Agent A strictly prefers Hb to Ha, since we have:
U
EZ
γA (H
a) − U
EZ
γA (H
b) =
1
2
γB − γA
(1 − γB)2ε
2 + O(ε
3) < 0 since γA > γB
As a conclusion, B cannot be more risk-averse than A with respect to R.
This latter proposition emphasizes that, unless we deny that a spread in a simple heads
or tails gamble is an increase in risk, Epstein and Zin utility functions cannot be considered
as appropriate tools for exploring the role of risk aversion. Changing the parameter γ in
Epstein and Zin utility functions does involve changing cardinal preferences while holding
ordinal preferences constant, but there is no direct relation between risk aversion and the γ
parameter. An agent with a higher value of γ will exhibit greater aversion to some particular
increases in risk (the second example in the proof), but also reduced aversion for some other
kinds of increases in risk (the ﬁrst example in the proof). Interpreting the results obtained
from changes in the value of γ as reﬂecting the impact of risk aversion is therefore misleading.
14Since Epstein and Zin utility functions are a particular case of Selden utility functions,
Proposition 1 a fortiori implies that considerations about the concavity of the function v in
Selden utility functions has no direct interpretation in terms of risk aversion.
The reason for which Epstein and Zin utility functions are not well ordered in terms of
risk aversion is fairly intuitive. Rewrite the Epstein and Zin utility function as:
U
EZ
γ (c1,e c2) =
c
1−ρ
1
1 − ρ
+
E[e c2]1−ρ
1 − ρ
 
E
"
e c2
E[e c2]
1−γ#! 1−ρ
1−γ
It is clear that a greater value of γ means greater relative risk aversion with respect
to second-period consumption. But, there is no monotonic relation between relative risk
over second-period consumption and aggregate risk over lifetime utility – with the latter
being what matters for comparative risk aversion. A gamble may imply greater relative risk
over second-period consumption than another, but at the same time less absolute risk over
lifetime utility. This is actually the case when we compare the gambles Gb and Ga deﬁned
above. Even if the “relative” risk expressed as a share of average second-period consumption
is larger in Gb than in Ga, the (absolute) risk embedded in Ga is greater than that in Gb.
Agent B with γB < γA prefers lottery Gb with the greatest second-period “relative risk”
while were he to be less risk-averse he should prefer lottery Ga with less aggregate risk.
The divergence between our conclusions and those of Epstein and Zin stems from that,
according to our approach, the risk that matters to individuals is life-time risk, and not the
risk over second period consumption. The diﬀerence becomes of course of importance when
looking at behaviors that impact individual’s well being at diﬀerent periods of time, like
saving behaviors.
3.3. Theory, Part 2: General Lotteries
In the remainder of the paper, we consider the general case of lotteries. The cost for
this generalization is that there are now many possible deﬁnitions for an increase in risk,
implying diﬀerent meanings for being “more risk-averse than”. We argue that this diﬃculty
should be acknowledged, rather than ignored. Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of what is an increase
in risk provide diﬀerent notions of comparative risk aversion. However, we will show that
the consideration of simple spreads (which are just a generalization of the spread relation
introduced above for gambles) allows us to derive a general model-free result that makes it
possible to derive unambiguous conclusions regarding the impact of risk aversion in a wide
variety of frameworks.
153.3.1. The setting
The setting is very similar to that initially described in Section 3.1.1, the only diﬀerence
being that we no longer restrict the sample space Ω, which is a priori uncountable, nor the
probability Pr. The set X is endowed with a preference relation , and L(X) is the set of
lotteries, deﬁned over Ω and paying oﬀ in X. As we only consider risks with well speciﬁed
probabilities, there is no loss of generality to restrict to a canonical probability space, such
that Ω = [0,1], F is the Borel σ−algebra of subsets in [0,1], and Pr is the Lebesgue measure.
For simplicity’s sake, we suppose that the ordinal preference relationship  over X can
be represented by a function U : X → R. We shall however insist on the fact that the results
we derive do not depend on a particular utility representation. Any utility representation of
, based on a diﬀerent utility function would yield the same conclusions. The cumulative
distribution function for a lottery ` ∈ L(X) is denoted F` and is deﬁned over R. For any
real number u, F`(u) is simply the probability (Pr deﬁned over the probability space) that
the utility of the lottery realization (whose value is in X) is smaller than a given u:
∀u ∈ R, F`(u) = Pr{U(`(ω)) ≤ u|ω ∈ Ω}
A lottery ` will be said to ﬁrst-order dominate a lottery `0 if and only if F`(u) ≤ F`0(u)
for all u, and to strictly ﬁrst-order dominate `0, if there additionally exists v such that
F`(v) < F`0(v). It is clear that this notion of dominance is independent of the utility function
that is chosen to represent the preference relation .
The preferences of agents A and B i (i = A,B) over a subset Y ⊆ L(X) of lotteries are
compatible with ordinal preferences (Assumption 1) and ordinal dominance (Property 3).
3.3.2. Comparative riskiness
In order to apply the general procedure for comparing risk aversion (Deﬁnition 4), we
need a notion of “riskier than” that is valid for lotteries. We generalize the notion of spread
introduced in Deﬁnition 5 as follows:
Deﬁnition 7 (p−Spread). Given a scalar p ∈]0,1[, a lottery ` is a said to be a p−spread
of the lottery `0 that we denote by ` `p `0, if there exists u0 ∈ R such that:
1. for all u < u0, p ≥ F`(u) ≥ F`0(u),
2. for all u ≥ u0, p ≤ F`(u) ≤ F`0(u).
This deﬁnition generalizes the previous notion of gamble spread. In particular, if Gx a
gamble spread of Gy according to Deﬁnition 5, Gx is also a 1
2−spread of Gy according to
16Deﬁnition 7. This deﬁnition also means that F` single-crosses F`0, with the crossing occurring
at the y-value of p. In Figure 1, lottery ` is a p−spread of lottery `0.
1
u
F(u)
`0
`
u0
p
Figure 1: p−spread ` `p `0
It is worth noting that the above deﬁnition does not depend on the choice of the rep-
resentation U of preferences, but only on ordinal preferences.7 If a lottery ` is a utility
spread of another lottery `0 for a given utility representation U, then it will also be so for
any representation corresponding to the same ordinal preferences. The p−spread property
is therefore an ordinal and not a cardinal concept.
We can then easily check that the p−spread relation is reﬂexive and transitive, and thus
deﬁnes a partial preorder on Y . We also argue that if a lottery ` is a p−spread of the lottery
`0, then ` is riskier than `0. Comparing ` to `0, states of the world can be split up into “bad
states” with measure p, and “good states” with measure 1 − p, such that: (i) the outcome
of ` or `0 obtained in any good state of the world is preferable to that which is obtained
in bad states of the world; (ii) conditional on the state being good, the lottery ` ﬁrst-order
dominates the lottery `0, while the reverse holds when states are bad. The lotteries ` and
`0 can be seen as the result of binary gambles (determining whether the state of the world
is bad, with probability p, or good, with probability 1 − p) with the good outcome of `
dominating the good outcome of `0, and the bad outcome of ` being dominated by the bad
outcome of `0. In this sense, it seems clear that ` is riskier than `0, since it pays oﬀ more in
good states and less in bad states.
7This would not be the case for other notions of dispersion, such as that suggested by Bickel and Lehman
[2], or for mean-preserving spreads, second-order stochastic dominance, etc.
17It is possible to deﬁne a notion of spread as ` ` `0 if and only if ` `p `0 for some p ∈]0,1[.
A number of papers, such as Jewitt [13] and Johnson and Myatt [14], have used such spreads
or single-crossing properties as a criterion of greater dispersion. This deﬁnition has many
appealing features, but is not transitive and thus does not build a risk order. As it may
seem unappealing to have a notion of “riskier than”, which is not transitive, we introduce
the notion of a p−spread. Results relying on assumptions valid for all p can equivalently be
expressed using the spread relation `. It is noteworthy that taking the transitive closure of
this single-crossing property is not a good alternative to the p−spread, since the succession
of two single crossings may yield something inﬁnitely close to an increase in risk. Formally,
we can have `1 ` `2 ` `3 and `3 very close to a lottery `0 such that `0 ` `1.
When considering preferences over certain×uncertain consumption pairs, both the Kihl-
strom and Mirman and Quiggin utility functions can easily be ordered in terms of aversion
for p−spread increases in risk. This result extends the characterization obtained in Result 2.
Result 3 (Comparative risk aversion and standard utility classes). The following re-
sults hold for Kihlstrom and Mirman and Quiggin utility functions:
• An agent with a utility function UKM
kA is more risk-averse than an agent with a utility
function UKM
kB with respect to the p−spread relation for every p ∈]0,1[ if and only if
kA is more concave than kB.
• An agent with a utility function U
Q
φA is more risk-averse than an agent with a utility
function U
Q
φB with respect to the p−spread relation for every p ∈]0,1[ if and only if φ
A
is more convex than φ
B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Regarding the Epstein and Zin class, Proposition 1 states that Epstein and Zin utility
functions are not properly ranked with respect to aversion for 1/2−spread increases in risk,
so that there is no chance of reaching a conclusion similar to those of Result 3.
3.3.3. A model-free result
Having provided a formal meaning of comparative risk aversion, we are now interested
in deriving results for the impact of risk aversion on agents’ behaviors. We suppose that
agents may chose an action t ∈ I ⊆ R, which modiﬁes the payoﬀ of a lottery. Such a
lottery is noted `t ∈ Y and its realization when state ω ∈ Ω occurs is `t(ω) ∈ X. With
minimal assumptions, which are detailed below, we prove a very general result stating that
the optimal action under uncertainty covaries monotonically with risk aversion.
18Our ﬁrst assumption is that the action t has a true eﬀect on lotteries.
Assumption 2 (Non-Constant). Consider two actions t1 ∈ I and t2 ∈ I. If `t1(ω) ∼
`t2(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then t1 = t2.
The above assumption is obviously a necessary condition for our model-free result. In
the extreme case, when t does not have any inﬂuence on the lottery `t, we would obviously
be silent about the impact of the risk aversion on the choice of the action.
Second, we make an assumption of single-peakedness. For each ω ∈ Ω, the application
t 7→ `t(ω) is single-peaked, which implies that in a given state of the world ω: (i) there exists
a best action tω and (ii) an action is all the more preferred the closer it is to tω.
Assumption 3 (Single-Peakedness). For all ω ∈ Ω:
(i) ∃tω ∈ Ω such that ∀t ∈ I, `tω(ω)  `t(ω)
(ii) t1 ≤ t2 ≤ tω ≤ t3 ≤ t4 (∈ I), ⇒



`tω(ω)  `t2(ω)  `t1(ω)
`tω(ω)  `t3(ω)  `t4(ω)
Third, we assume that actions do not modify the initial order of the lottery outcomes.
In other words, for any pair of actions t and t0, the lotteries `t and `t0 are comonotonic.
Assumption 4 (Comonotonicity). Consider two states ω1,ω2 ∈ Ω. Lottery outcomes
satisfy the following implication:
(`t(ω1)  `t(ω2) for some t ∈ I) ⇒ (`t0(ω1)  `t0(ω2) for all t
0 ∈ I)
When Assumption 4 holds, the states of the world may be ranked from good to bad,
independently of agents’ actions. We then write ω1 ≥ ω2 if `t(ω1)  `t(ω2) for all t ∈ I. This
assumption holds whenever it is possible to tell what constitutes good news, without knowing
agents’ actions. It is for example the case when considering random income, random returns,
provided that we suppose that agents’ well-being increases with wealth. This assumption
may not however hold in other circumstances, for example when action t involves betting on
a particular horse, since in this case the action determines which outcome is preferred.
The last assumption we make for practical purposes is that the sequence of optimal
actions (tω)ω∈Ω is ordered according to the states of the world ω. The better the state of the
world ω, the greater is the optimal action tω.
19Assumption 5 (Action order). For any states ω1,ω2 ∈ Ω, ω1 ≥ ω2 =⇒ tω1 ≥ tω2.
This last assumption is simply technical. We can always deﬁne a bijection ψ : I → I
such that ψ(t) is well-ordered and that Assumption 5 holds.
It is now possible to formalize a general result about the role of risk aversion:
Proposition 2 (A general model-free result). Consider two agents A and B who have
to choose an action t providing them with a lottery satisfying Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 5.
We assume that the preferences of agents A and B satisfy ordinal dominance and deﬁne the
respective single optimal actions tA and tB. The following implication then holds:
If agent A is more risk-averse than agent B with respect to the p−spread relation for
every p ∈]0;1[ then tA ≤ tB.
Proof. We assume that tA > tB. In order to obtain a contradiction, we prove that lottery
`tA is a p−spread of `tB for some p ∈]0;1[. In this case we have that `tA A `tB and `tA `p `tB,
which would imply that `tA B `tB because A is more risk-averse than B, contradicting the
optimality of tB for agent B. Proving that lottery `tA is a p−spread of `tB involves showing
that there exists u0 ∈ R and p ∈]0;1[, such that p ≥ F`tA(u) ≥ F`tB(u) for u < u0 and
p ≤ F`tA(u) ≤ F`tB(u) for u ≥ u0.
We deﬁne ξ
− as the subset of R, where the cdf of `tB is larger than that of `tA. Conversely,
ξ
+ is the subset, where the cdf of `tA is larger than that of `tB.
ξ
− =

u ∈ R,F`tB(u) ≥ F`tA(u)
	
and ξ
+ =

u ∈ R,F`tA(u) ≥ F`tB(u)
	
First, note that each u ∈ R belongs either to ξ
+ or ξ
−: ξ
+∪ξ
− = R. We then distinguish
four cases, depending on whether the sets ξ
+ and ξ
− are included in each other or not.
1. Suppose that ξ
+ = ξ
− = R. This means that for all u ∈ R, F`tA(u) = F`tB(u), which
implies that lotteries pay oﬀ the same outcomes in all states of the world. Assumption
2 implies that tA = tB, which contradicts the assumption that tB < tA.
2. Suppose that ξ
+ ( ξ
− (this means that ξ
+ is either empty or contains only elements u
such that F`tA(u) = F`tB(u)). The cdf of lottery `tB is always larger than that of `tA,
and is strictly larger at least once: `tA strictly ﬁrst-order dominates the lottery `tB.
Since preferences satisfy ordinal dominance (Property 3), agent B strictly prefers `tA
to `tB, which contradicts the optimality of tB.
3. Suppose that ξ
− ( ξ
+. It analogously contradicts the optimality of tA for agent A.
204. We now necessarily have ξ
− 6⊂ ξ
+ and ξ
+ 6⊂ ξ
−. There exists at least one element in
each set, not belonging to the other one, which we denote u+ ∈ ξ
+ (and u+ / ∈ ξ
−) and
u− ∈ ξ
− (and u− / ∈ ξ
+).
We ﬁrst focus on u−. By deﬁnition, 1 − F`tB(u−) < 1 − F`tA(u−), or equivalently
{ω ∈ Ω|U(`tB(ω)) ≥ u−} ( {ω ∈ Ω|U(`tA(ω)) ≥ u−}. There exists ω1 ∈ Ω in the
second set but not in the ﬁrst: U(`tB(ω1)) ≤ u− ≤ U(`tA(ω1)). Single-peakedness
(Assumption 3) implies that there exists tω1 such that: tω1 ≥ tA ≥ tB.
We consider u ≥ u− and want to show that {ω ∈ Ω|U(`tB(ω)) ≥ u} ⊆ {ω ∈
Ω|U(`tA(ω)) ≥ u}. Let ωu ∈ {ω ∈ Ω|U(`tB(ω)) ≥ u}. Since U(`tB(ωu)) ≥ u ≥
u− ≥ U(`tB(ω1)), we deduce, from Assumption 4 of comonotonicity, that ωu ≥ ω1.
From Assumption 5, we deduce that tωu ≥ tω1 ≥ tA > tB. Single-peakedness allows us
to conclude that U(`tA(ωu)) ≥ U(`tB(ωu)) ≥ u and ωu ∈ {ω ∈ Ω|U(`tA(ω)) ≥ u}.
We have therefore proved that [u−,+∞[⊆ ξ
−. We can show analogously that ] −
∞,u+] ⊆ ξ
+. u+ (resp. u−) is a lower (resp. upper) bound for ξ
− (resp. ξ
+) (otherwise
u+ ∈ ξ
−, which is contradictory). We thus deﬁne u = inf ξ
− and u = supξ
+, which
satisfy u ≤ u (otherwise ξ
+ ∪ ξ
− 6= R). We deﬁne u0 as an element of the non-empty
segment [u;u] and p as an element of

limu→u,u<u F`tA(u);limu→u,u>u F`tA(u)

(cdf are
right-continuous and have left limits, both everywhere, and the last segment collapses
to a singleton when F`tA is continuous or when u < u). The cdf F`tA and F`tB satisfy:
∀u < u0, F`tB(u) ≤ F`tA(u) ≤ p and ∀u ≥ u0, F`tB(u) ≥ F`tA(u) ≥ p
According to Deﬁnition 7, this therefore shows that lottery `tA is a p−spread of `tB,
which terminates the proof.
This model-free result shows that, under some mild assumptions, the more risk-averse
is the agent, the smaller is his optimal action. We can summarize the intuition as follows.
Consider the optimal action tB. We can group the states of the worlds into two subsets. The
ﬁrst consists of the states ω for which the optimal actions tω are smaller than tB, while the
second consists of the states for which the optimal actions are larger than tB. Since without
uncertainty optimal actions are assumed to be larger when the state of the world is better,
we can qualify the former as “bad” states of the world and the latter as “good” states. Due
to single-peakedness, choosing an action t smaller than tB involves increasing the agent’s
welfare in bad states and reducing it in good states. Opting for a smaller action is thus one
way of redistributing welfare from good to bad states, and a way of reducing risk regarding
agent welfare. Such a strategy is preferred by more risk-averse agents.
214. Applications
We use Proposition 2 to analyze in a very simple two-period framework the savings
behavior of an agent facing uncertainty. We consider in turns three types of uncertainty: (i)
second-period income is random; (ii) the savings interest rate is uncertain; and (iii) the agent
faces a mortality risk, i.e. a risk of dying at the end of the ﬁrst period. For simplicity, we
simply write in this section “agent A is more risk averse than B” to actually mean that “A
is more risk-averse than agent B with respect to the p−spread relation for every p ∈]0,1[”.
4.1. Application to precautionary savings
We consider the case of agents who live for two periods, have random second-period
incomes, and have to decide how much to save. This very simple problem has been the
object of number of inspirational contributions, including Leland [20], Sandmo [25], Drèze
and Modigliani [8], Caperaa and Eeckhoudt [5], Kimball [16], and Kimball and Weil [17].
These led to the development of the notion of prudence, whose link to risk aversion has not
been clariﬁed despite some impressive eﬀorts (Kimball and Weil, [17]). We will see, however,
that our general approach does lead to clear and simple conclusions.
To apply our general result, we specify the setting as in Section 3.2.3. The set X = (R+)
2
is endowed with an ordinal preference relationship  represented by a utility function u. The
set of lotteries with outcomes in X is denoted L(X), and Y ⊆ L(X) is the set of lotteries with
deterministic ﬁrst-period consumption. We consider two agents A and B with preferences
i (i = A,B) deﬁned over Y . We assume that these preferences satisfy the consistency
assumption and ordinal dominance.
We now introduce two assumptions regarding ordinal preferences.
Assumption 6 (Convexity of ordinal preferences). For all (c1,c2), (c0
1,c0
2), and (c00
1,c00
2)
in X, and all λ ∈ [0,1]:
(c
0
1,c
0
2)  (c1,c2) and (c
00
1,c
00
2)  (c1,c2) =⇒ (λc
0
1 + (1 − λ)c
00
1,λc
0
2 + (1 − λ)c
00
2)  (c1,c2)
Assumption 7 (Normality of ﬁrst-period consumption). Consider the agent’s opti-
mization problem maxc1,c2 u(c1,c2) subject to the budget constraint c1 + 1
(1+R)c2 = I, where
I ≥ 0 is the discounted total certain income and R > −1 the gross certain interest rate. The
ordinal preference relationship  is such that this problem has a unique solution denoted
(c1(I,R),c2(I,R)), where, additionally, ﬁrst-period consumption c1(I,R) increases with to-
tal income I.
22The assumption of preference convexity is fairly standard in the analysis of consumer
behavior.8 This implies Assumption 3 of single-peakedness which is required for our model-
free result.9 Assumption 7 of good normality is also very standard. In cases where the
preference relation  can be represented by a diﬀerentiable utility function u(c1,c2) over
ﬁrst-period c1 and second-period c2 consumptions, this assumption concerns the derivative
of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in both periods relative to second-
period consumption (namely ∂
∂c2

∂u
∂c1
∂u
∂c2

> 0). However, we believe that greater insight is
gained by emphasizing that the requirement is good normality.
We can now express our ﬁnding with respect to precautionary savings:
Proposition 3 (Precautionary savings). Consider two agents A and B, who choose ﬁrst-
period consumption c1 providing them with a certain×uncertain income proﬁle denoted
(c1,e y2 + (1 + R)(y1 − c1)), where y1 > 0 is certain ﬁrst-period income, e y2 random second-
period income, and R > −1 the certain interest rate. If:
1. The ordinal preference relationship  satisﬁes Assumptions 6 and 7.
2. Risk preferences A and B satisfy ordinal dominance and deﬁne optimal ﬁrst-period
consumption levels of cA
1 and cB
1 .
Then, the following implication holds:
Agent A is more risk-averse than agent B =⇒ c
A
1 ≤ c
B
1
Proof. This proposition comes via an application of the model-free result formulated in
Proposition 2. We simply need to check that the required assumptions hold in this setting,
when the action chosen by the agent is the ﬁrst-period consumption c1.
• Assumptions 2 and 4 hold by construction.
• The normality of ﬁrst-period consumption (Assumption 7) ensures that Assumption 5
regarding optimal-action ordering holds. Indeed, the better the state of the world (i.e.,
the larger is second-period income), the greater is optimal ﬁrst-period consumption.
8See for example the discussion in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [21], page 44.
9This is formally shown below, in the proof of Proposition 3. In fact, single-peakedness and convexity are
equivalent in the case of continuous preferences that we do not assume here.
23• The convexity of the relation  implies the single peakedness of preferences. Let
s? be the solution of maxs u(y1 − s,y2 + (1 + R)s) and consider, for example, s0 <
s00 < s?. By the deﬁnition of s?, we have ﬁrst that (y1 − s?,y2 + (1 + R)s?) 
(y1 − s0,y2 + (1 + R)s0) and also (y1 − s0,y2 + (1 + R)s0)  (y1 − s0,y2 + (1 + R)s0).
Convexity then implies that for all λ ∈ [0,1] we can deduce (y1 − (λs? + (1 − λ)s0),
y2 + (1 + R)(λs? + (1 − λ)s0))  (y1 − s0,y2 + (1 + R)s0). As s0 < s00 < s?, we can
choose λ ∈ [0,1], such that s00 = λs? + (1 − λ)s0, which proves single-peakedness.
This proposition makes it clear that the greater is risk aversion, the more the agent
saves. The intuition behind this result is very simple. Take an agent who decides to save
s(e y2) anticipating a random second-period income of e y2. For simplicity, we assume that this
random income can take two values, y2 and y2. The amount s(e y2) is an intermediate value
between what he would have saved knowing that he would receive y2 and what he would
have saved knowing that he would earn y2: s(y2) < s(e y2) < s (y2). By saving more than
s(e y2) he increases his welfare in the bad state of the world, but reduces it in the good state.
As this diminishes the degree of risk regarding his welfare, larger savings will therefore be
preferred by more risk-averse agents.
This result clariﬁes the link between prudence and risk aversion. Agents may be prudent
or imprudent in the sense that they may react positively or negatively to an increase in income
uncertainty. Drèze and Modigliani [8] and Kimball [16] have established the conditions for
prudence to occur in the expected utility framework. Our results complement their ﬁndings
by showing that, for a given level of income uncertainty, increasing risk aversion leads to
increased savings.
4.2. Application to optimal savings with interest-rate uncertainty
We now raise the question of the relationship between optimal savings and risk aversion,
not in the face of income uncertainty, but rather interest-rate uncertainty. This question was
addressed by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15] in the expected-utility framework, and Langlais
[19] for Selden utility functions, with diverging conclusions.
The formal setting of this question (the structure of X, etc.) is exactly the same as in
the previous section. However, the ordinal properties that are required to obtain results
regarding risk aversion are diﬀerent.
In a deterministic setting, increasing the interest rate is equivalent to changing the price
of second-period consumption, generating both income and substitution eﬀects. A higher
interest rate means a lower price for second-period consumption, with a positive income
eﬀect yielding higher ﬁrst-period consumption and lower savings. The substitution eﬀect
24reduces ﬁrst-period consumption, and therefore increases savings. The income and substi-
tution eﬀects thus have opposing eﬀects on optimal savings, and the overall eﬀect may be
either positive or negative. For the sake of clarity, we deﬁne the optimal savings function
s(y1,y2,R) = argmaxs (y1 − s,y2 + (1 + R)s). This function may either rise or fall with
respect to R, depending on ordinal preferences. This sign is key for the determination of the
eﬀect of risk aversion on savings when interest rates are non-deterministic.
Proposition 4 (Savings with an uncertain interest rate). Consider two agents A and
B, who choose ﬁrst-period consumption c1 providing them with a certain×uncertain income
proﬁle

c1,y2 + (1 + e R)(y1 − c1)

, where y1 > 0 (y2 > 0) is certain ﬁrst- (second-) period
income, and e R is the random interest rate. If:
1. The ordinal preference relationship  satisﬁes Assumption 6.
2. Risk preferences A and B satisfy the ordinal dominance and deﬁne optimal ﬁrst-
period consumptions cA
1 and cB
1 .
Then, the following implication holds:
Agent A is more risk-averse than agent B =⇒

   
   
cA
1 ≤ cB
1 if R 7→ s(y1,y2,R) is decreasing
or
cB
1 ≤ cA
1 if R 7→ s(y1,y2,R) is increasing
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is very similar to that in Proposition 3. When the
substitution eﬀect dominates, in order to directly use the result of Proposition 2, we may
consider that the action is not c1, but rather s = y1 − c1.
Our ﬁndings extend those in Kihlstrom and Mirman [15]. In an expected-utility frame-
work, with diﬀerentiable utility functions, they derive a similar result as in Proposition 4.
They express that the derivative ∂s
∂R is positive (negative) if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is greater (less) than one. The preceding proposition could then be expressed
by referring to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, although this would
be slightly less general (as diﬀerentiability would then be required). Our results however
contradict those in Langlais [19], who considers Selden utility functions. Our explanation is
that these latter utility functions are not well-ordered in terms of risk aversion.
4.3. Application to optimal savings with lifetime uncertainty
In our last application, we consider the eﬀect of an uncertain lifetime on optimal savings.
The traditional view in Economics is that risk aversion and time preference are orthogonal
25aspects of preferences. However, Bommier [4] has underlined that as soon as we take lifetime
uncertainty into account, there is a strong direct relationship between risk aversion and
time discounting, with signiﬁcant implications for savings behavior.10 Bommier’s results
were however derived in an expected-utility framework, omitting some aspects of preferences
such as bequests. Here we show how the impact of risk aversion on savings with lifetime
uncertainty can be addressed without assuming expected utility but allowing for bequests.
We consider an agent who has an initial endowment W and who may live for one or
two time periods. This agent chooses his consumption c1 in the ﬁrst period. In the second
period, either he survives and consumes his wealth, or dies, and his wealth is transmitted
to his heirs, for whom he may care. To account for the potential existence of annuities, we
assume that the return to saving may depend on whether the agent survives or not. More
precisely, if we denote by ca
2 the second-period consumption in the case where the agent is
alive, and by cd
2 the amount transmitted to his heirs if he dies, we have: ca
2 = (1+Ra)(W −c1)
and cd
2 = (1 + Rd)(W − c1), where Ra and Rd are the savings returns in the case of survival
and death respectively. We assume that Ra > −1 and Rd ≥ −1, but make no assumptions
about the relative values of Ra and Rd. When there are no annuities or taxes on bequests
we have Ra = Rd, while with perfect annuities we have Ra > Rd = −1. There are also many
intermediary situations (e.g. when there are taxes on bequests) or contracts (life insurance)
with Rd greater than Ra.
We now apply our model-free result to show that risk aversion generates an unambiguous
result. Formally, the set X has to be deﬁned to reﬂect the speciﬁcity of the context. The
second-period outcome can no longer be described by a scalar variable c2, but by a pair
(c2,σ) of a scalar c2 and a binary variable σ ∈ {a,d} indicating whether the individual is
dead or alive. This means that X = (R+)
2 × {a,d}. The notation (c1,c2)a and (c1,c2)d will
however be used instead of the cumbersome (c1,c2,a) and (c1,c2,d). The index a or d thus
indicates whether the individual is alive or not in the second period.
We make three assumptions regarding ordinal preferences. First, we suppose that the
agent always prefers to live in the second period and to consume, rather than to die and
bequeath his wealth. Second, we suppose that optimal saving conditional on living for two
periods is greater than optimal saving conditional on living one period. In other words, in a
deterministic setting, the propensity to consume falls with life duration. This seems a very
natural assumption in this setting, where agents have no second-period income. Last, we
introduce a convexity assumption similar to Assumption 6, but taking into account that X
10See also Bommier’s working paper “Rational Impatience?”, downloadable at http://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/hal-00441880/fr/ where the relation between risk aversion and time discounting is formalized
in Proposition 4.
26is convex, and not even connected.
Assumption 8. Ordinal preferences satisfy the following properties:
• The agent is always better oﬀ when alive: ∀c1, (c1,(1 + Ra)(W − c1))a  (c1,(1 +
Rd)(W − c1))d
• For i = a,d, all W > 0 and Ra,Rd ≥ −1, the problem maxs u(W − s,(1 + Ri)s)i has
a unique solution si.
• Optimal saving when surviving is always greater than that when dying: sa > sd.
• Ordinal preferences are convex over both (R+)
2 × {a} and (R+)
2 × {d}.
Given Assumption 8, Proposition 2 allows us to determine how the savings of an agent
facing an uncertain lifetime depend on risk aversion.
Proposition 5 (Saving when lifetime is uncertain). We consider two agents A and B,
who face an (identical) exogenous risk of dying after the ﬁrst period. They have to choose
a saving level of s providing them with a consumption proﬁle of (W − s,(1 + Ra)s)a if they
survive and a consumption-bequest proﬁle of (W − s,(1 + Rd)s)d if they die. If:
1. The ordinal preference relationship  satisﬁes Assumption 8.
2. Risk preferences A and B satisfy the ordinal dominance and deﬁne optimal savings
sA and sB.
Then the following implication holds:
Agent A is more risk-averse than agent B =⇒ s
A ≤ s
B
Proof. Assumptions 2 and 3 hold by construction of the consumption proﬁle and the
convexity of preferences. Assumptions 4 and 5 directly stem from Assumption 8. The result
is then straightforward from Proposition 2.
The more risk-averse agent saves less. In other words, when mortality is taken into
account, there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and impatience. We shall
however emphasize that Proposition 5 assumes that agents A and B have the same prob-
ability of dying. The relation between risk aversion and impatience holds when comparing
27agents with identical mortality, but can not be applied to any correlations obtained from
individuals with diﬀerent mortality risks.11
5. Conclusion
The most common approach to quantifying (and comparing) agents’ risk aversion involves
focusing on how individuals compare lotteries with certain outcomes. In this paper we argue
that this is not suﬃcient, as risk aversion also reﬂects agents’ willingness to marginally
reduce risks. We therefore consider a formal procedure to compare agents’ aversion to
(marginal) increases in risk. This procedure can be applied to many settings, since it does
not presuppose any kind of structure for the set of consequences. Moreover, it makes it
possible to derive general predictions about the impact of risk aversion in a wide variety of
problems, as illustrated with our “model free” result.
To demonstrate the interest of our general approach we apply it to three intertemporal
problems, where the role of risk aversion is not well understood. We ﬁrst identify what are
the relevant classes of utility functions to study the role of risk aversion in intertemporal
settings. Interestingly enough, we ﬁnd that relying on Epstein and Zin utility functions is
inadequate, since these functions are not well ordered in terms of risk aversion. Kihlstrom
and Mirman preferences, or those arising from Quiggin’s anticipated utility theory are better
alternatives. Though, in a number of cases, predictions on the role of risk aversion are easier
to obtain through our general approach than when relying on speciﬁc models of preferences.
In particular we clarify the link between risk aversion and prudence, showing that precau-
tionary savings increase with risk aversion. We also prove that when considering lifetime
uncertainty, greater risk aversion should lead to lower savings.
Our approach could also be relevant for a number of problems that we could not consider
in a single paper. An interesting possibility, which we leave for further contributions, is to
consider X as being a set of lotteries and discuss preferences over two-stage lotteries as it
is done in many applied papers on ambiguity aversion. We would then obtain model-free
results on the impact of ambiguity aversion.
Appendix A. Proofs
Appendix A.1. Proof of Result 2
We consider each utility class in turn.
11In particular, the fact that women might seem to be more patient and more risk-averse than men should
not be interpreted as contradicting this proposition. This could in fact follow from gender diﬀerences in
mortality.
281. Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions.
We deﬁne kA = k ◦ kB where k is increasing and continuous. The utility associated to a
gamble (xl;xh) for agent A is: UKM
kA (xl;xh) = k
−1
A

kA(xl)+kA(xh)
2

= k
−1
A

k(kB(xl))+k(kB(xh))
2

.
• We assume that k is concave. Let (xl;xh) and (yl;yh) be two gambles. By deﬁnition:
(xl;xh) A (yl;yh) iﬀ:
k (kB(xl)) + k (kB(xh))
2
≥
k (kB(yl)) + k (kB(yh))
2
(A.1)
Since xl < yl ≤ yh < xh and kB is increasing, the inequality in (A.1) becomes:
k (kB(xh)) − k (kB(yh))
kB(xh) − kB(yh)
≥
k (kB(yl)) − k (kB(xl))
kB(yl) − kB(xl)
kB(yl) − kB(xl)
kB(xh) − kB(yh)
(if kB(xh) = kB(yh) or kB(xl) = kB(yl), the result is straightforward)
k is concave, which implies that 0 ≤
k(kB(xh))−k(kB(yh))
kB(xh)−kB(yh) ≤
k(kB(yl))−k(kB(xl))
kB(yl)−kB(xl) . We deduce
from both previous inequalities that:
1 ≥
kB(yl) − kB(xl)
kB(xh) − kB(yh)
or
kB(xl) + kB(xh)
2
≥
kB(yl) + kB(yh)
2
(A.2)
which implies that by similarity with (A.1) that B prefers (xl;xh) to (yl;yh).
• We now assume that A is more risk-averse than B, and that the inequality in (A.1) and
(xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) imply the inequality in (A.2). We choose a level of income y = yl = yh
such that the inequality in (A.1) holds with equality for a given pair (xl,xh). The
inequality in (A.2) then implies that k(
kB(xl)+kB(xh)
2 ) ≥ k(kB(y)) =
k(kB(xl))+k(kB(xh))
2 ,
or that k is concave.12
2. Quiggin anticipated utility function.
We consider two gambles (xl;xh) ` (yl;yh) (xl < yl ≤ yh < xh; the result is straightfor-
ward if there is equality), such that agent A prefers (xl;xh) to (yl;yh). It means U
Q
φA(xl;xh) ≥
U
Q
φA(yl;yh) or φ
A(1
2) ≥
yl−xl
xh−yh+yl−xl, since the utility associated with the gamble (xl;xh) for
A is U
Q
φA(xl;xh) = xl + (xh − xl)φ
A(1/2).
It is then straightforward that agent B prefers (xl;xh) to (yl;yh) iﬀ φ
B(1
2) ≥ φ
A(1
2).
Appendix A.2. Proof of Result 3
We prove the result for each utility class.
12A continuous function f is concave iﬀ for all x1,x2, f
 x1+x2
2

≥
f(x1)+f(x2)
2 .
291. Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions.
1. a. The ﬁrst implication directly stems from our previous Result 2.
1. b. Suppose now that kA is more concave than kB, i.e. that kA = k ◦ kB, with k
continuous, increasing, and concave. We consider two lotteries `1 and `2, such that: `1 `p `2
for some p ∈]0,1[ and `1 A `2. As agent A prefers `1 to `2, we have:
Z ∞
−∞
k
 
k
B(u)

dF`1(u) ≥
Z ∞
−∞
k
 
k
B(u)

dF`2(u) (A.3)
Since `1 `p `2 there exists u0 ∈ R, such that p ≥ F`1(u) ≥ F`2(u) for u < u0 and
p ≤ F`1(u) ≤ F`2(u) for u ≥ u0. Any concave function deﬁned over an open set admits
left and right derivatives everywhere. Both are equal to each other and the function is
diﬀerentiable, except on a countable set.13 In consequence, we deduce that there exists a
(countable) partition {sj,j ∈ Z} of R, such that k and kB are diﬀerentiable on every interval
]sj,sj+1[ and that s0 ≡ u0 (for sake of simplicity). We deduce:
Z ∞
−∞
k
 
k
B(u)

dF`1(u) −
Z ∞
−∞
k
 
k
B(u)

dF`2(u) =
∞ X
j=−∞
Z sj+1
sj
k
 
k
B(u)

(dF`1(u) − dF`2(u))
=
∞ X
j=−∞
 
k
 
k
B(sj+1)

(F`1(sj+1) − F`2(sj+1)) − k
 
k
B(sj)

(F`1(sj) − F`2(sj))

(A.4)
−
∞ X
j=−∞
Z sj+1
sj
k
B0(u)k
0  
k
B(u)

(F`1(u) − F`2(u))du
Since we both have F`1(−∞) − F`2(−∞) = F`1(∞) − F`2(∞) = 0, the inequality (A.3)
simpliﬁes using (A.4) into:
∞ X
j=0
Z sj+1
sj
kB0(u)k0  
kB(u)

(F`2(u) − F`1(u))du ≥
0 X
j=−∞
Z sj+1
sj
kB0(u)k0  
kB(u)

(F`1(u) − F`2(u))
or:
Z ∞
u0
kB0(u)k0  
kB(u)

(F`2(u) − F`1(u))du ≥
Z u0
−∞
kB0(u)k0  
kB(u)

(F`1(u) − F`2(u)) (A.5)
Since k is increasing, concave and admits left and right derivatives everywhere, we also
have for u ≥ u0 = s0, 0 ≤ k0  
kB(u)

≤ k0,r  
kB(u0)

and for u ≤ u0 = s0, 0 ≤ k0,l  
kB(u0)

≤
k0  
kB(u)

, where k0,r (resp. k0,l) is the right (resp. left) derivative of k. Because F`1(u) −
13This result stems for example from Theorem 1.3.7 p. 23 in Nicolescu and Persson [22]
30F`2(u) ≥ 0 for u < u0 and F`2(u) − F`1(u) ≥ 0 for u ≥ u0, we obtain after simpliﬁcation:
k
0,r  
k
B(u0)
Z ∞
u0
k
B0(u)(F`2(u) − F`1(u))du ≥ k
0,l  
k
B(u0)
Z u0
−∞
k
B0(u)(F`1(u) − F`2(u))
and:
Z ∞
u0
k
B0(u)(F`2(u) − F`1(u))du ≥
Z u0
−∞
k
B0(u)(F`1(u) − F`2(u)),
since k0,l(kB(u0)) ≥ k0,r(kB(u0)) ≥ 0 and both integrals are positive. This inequality is
similar to (A.5) and states that agent B prefers `1 to `2, proving the result.
2. Quiggin anticipated utility functions. We use a proof strategy which is similar to
Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson [6].
2.a. First implication. Assume that agent A is more risk-averse than agent B. We
consider lotteries with four possible outcomes. `1 pays x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 with respective
probabilities p1, p2, p3, and p4 = 1 − p1 − p2 − p3. `2 pays x1, x2 − ε2, x3 + ε3, x4 with the
same probabilities, and with ε2, ε3 > 0 small enough to respect the initial outcome ranking.
`2 is a (p1 + p2)−spread of `1. The utility of A associated with `1 expresses as:
U
Q
φA(`1) = −x1(φ
A(1 − p1) − φ
A(1)) − x2(φ
A(1 − p1 − p2) − φ
A(1 − p1))
− x3(φ
A(1 − p1 − p2 − p3) − φ
A(1 − p1 − p2)) − x4(φ
A(0) − φ
A(1 − p1 − p2 − p3))
= x1 + (x2 − x1)φ
A(q2) + (x3 − x2)φ
A(q3) + (x4 − x3)φ
A(q4)
where: pj = qj − qj+1 with 1 = q1 ≥ q2 ≥ q3 ≥ q4 ≥ q5 = 0
We choose ε3 such that agent A is indiﬀerent between `2 and `1. Agent A being more
risk-averse than B, B prefers `2 to `1. Noting φ
A = φ◦φ
B (which implies that φ is increasing
and continuous), we have the following two relationships:
ε3
 
φ ◦ φ
B(q3) − φ ◦ φ
B(q4)

= ε2
 
φ ◦ φ
B(q2) − φ ◦ φ
B(q3)

ε3
 
φ
B(q3) − φ
B(q4)

≥ ε2
 
φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q3)

Substituting the ﬁrst equality (φ
B(q2) ≥ φ
B(q3) ≥ φ
B(q4) since φ
B is increasing) yields:
φ ◦ φ
B(q2)
φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q3)
+
φ ◦ φ
B(q4)
φ
B(q3) − φ
B(q4)
≥ φ ◦ φ
B(q3)
φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q4)
(φ
B(q3) − φ
B(q4))(φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q3))
and:
φ
B(q3) − φ
B(q4)
φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q4)
φ ◦ φ
B(q2) +
φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q3)
φ
B(q2) − φ
B(q4)
φ ◦ φ
B(q4) ≥ φ ◦ φ
B(q3)
Since
φB(q3)−φB(q4)
φB(q2)−φB(q4) > 0 and
φB(q2)−φB(q3)
φB(q2)−φB(q4) > 0, the last inequality states that φ is convex.
2.b. Second implication. We suppose that φ
A is more convex than φ
B, i.e. that φ
A =
31φ ◦ φ
B, with φ continuous, increasing, convex and φ(0) = φ(1) = 0. `1 and `2 are two
lotteries, such that: `1 `p `2 for some p ∈]0,1[ and `1 A `2, which implies:
−
Z ∞
−∞
ud
 
φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`1(u))

− φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`2(u))

≥ 0
or:
Z ∞
−∞
 
φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`1(u))

− φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`2(u))

≥ 0 because F1(±∞) = F2(±∞)
Since `1 `p `2 there exists u0 ∈ R, 1 − F`2(u) ≥ 1 − F`1(u) ≥ 1 − p for u ≤ u0 and
1 − F`2(u) ≤ 1 − F`1(u) ≤ 1 − p for u ≥ u0. We obtain:
Z u0
−∞

φ
 
φB(1 − F`2(u))

− φ
 
φB(1 − F`1(u))

du ≤
Z ∞
u0

φ
 
φB(1 − F`1(u))

− φ
 
φB(1 − F`2(u))

du
(A.6)
Focusing on the left-hand side, we deduce:
Z u0
−∞

φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`2(u))

− φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`1(u))

du =
Z u0
−∞
 
φ
B(1 − F`2(u)) − φ
B(1 − F`1(u))
 φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`2(u))

− φ
 
φ
B(1 − F`1(u))

φ
B(1 − F`2(u)) − φ
B(1 − F`1(u))
du
We use a similar argument as in the Kihlstrom and Mirman case. We denote φ
B(1 −
F`i(u)) = 1−ti (for i = 1,2). Since φ
B is increasing, 0 ≤ t2 ≤ t1 ≤ 1−φ
B(1−p) for u ≤ u0.
We then focus on
ψ(t1)−ψ(t2)
t1−t2 , where ψ(t) = −φ(1 − t) is increasing and concave. We can
ﬁnd a lower bound for this expression, which is ψ
0,l(1 − φ
B(1 − p)) = φ
0,r(φ
B(1 − p)). Since
φ
B(1 − F`2(u)) ≥ φ
B(1 − F`1(u)) for u ≤ u0, we deduce:
Z u0
−∞

φ
 
φB(1 − F`2(u))

− φ
 
φB(1 − F`1(u))

du ≥
φ0,r(φB(1 − p))
Z u0
−∞

φB(1 − F`2(u)) − φB(1 − F`1(u))

du
Focusing on the right-hand side of (A.6), we similarly obtain:
Z ∞
u0

φ
 
φB(1 − F`1(u))

− φ
 
φB(1 − F`2(u))

du ≤
φ0,l(φB(1 − p))
Z ∞
u0
 
φB(1 − F`1(u)) − φB(1 − F`2(u))

du
32The inequality (A.6) becomes:
φ0,r(φ(1 − p))
Z u0
−∞

φB(1 − F`2(u)) − φB(1 − F`1(u))

du ≤
φ0,l(φB(1 − p))
Z ∞
u0
 
φB(1 − F`1(u)) − φB(1 − F`2(u))

du
or:
Z u0
−∞

φB(1 − F`2(u)) − φB(1 − F`1(u))

du ≤
Z ∞
u0
 
φB(1 − F`1(u)) − φB(1 − F`2(u))

du
since 0 ≤ φ
0,l(1 − φ
B(p)) ≤ φ
0,r(1 − φ
B(p)) and both integrals are positive. Carrying out the
same manipulations in reverse order yields:
−
Z ∞
−∞
ud
 
φ
B (1 − F`1(u))

≥ −
Z ∞
−∞
ud
 
φ
B (1 − F`2(u))

Agent B therefore prefers lottery `1 to `2, which completes the proof.
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